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LIBERALIZED AGRICULTURAL TRADE -- AT THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, BILATERALLY OR NOT AT ALL!

By Ambassador Clayton K. Yeutter
Annual Meeting
Western Agricultural Economics Association
Ft. Collins, Colorado
July 20, 1976

For most of the 20th century, much of the world has
fretted about agricultural surpluses.

This has been parti-

cularly true of the major producing nations, with the
United States being in the forefront.

Only a decade ago,

our "ever normal granaries" were bursting at their steel
seams, and we were immersed in another agonizing appraisal
of U.S. farm policy.
Then the shock came!
on the production front

In 1972 everything went wrong
droughts, early frosts, monsoon

problems, even the fish meal supply diminished because of
an uncooperative ocean current.

We suddenly realized that

man was not quite as omniscient as he thought, especially
in the field of weather control.

And the Soviets realized

that they had a demanding consumer sector, even under a
totalitarian regime.

All of this caused reverberations

throughout this planet of ours, and the "world food problem"
was born.

Attention turned from surplus disposal programs

to concern over production and access to that production.
The basic question, of course, is "Can the world continue to feed itself?"

It is not my purpose to answer that
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query here, for it is a question the scope of which goes far
beyond the arena of international trade policy.
One factor, however, is so simple as to be often overlooked.

At any given point in time, we ought to do the best

we can with what we have!

In other words, with a finite

quantity of agricultural products available, or about to become available in the short run, those products should move
in international trade to where they are most in demand.

The

principle of comparative advantage should establish short
run production patterns, and the rules of international trade
should facilitate the distribution of that production in response to competitive market forces.
An oversimplified model, such as the one I have just outlined, obviously does not describe the real world.

It is easy

to rationalize departures from the model, particularly if one
is philosophically uncommitted to a market oriented economic
system in the first place.

The temptation of government inter-

vention has been irresistible in many nations, including some
which are in dire need of expanded food production.

As a con-

sequence, these nations have often ended up with agricultural
production disincentives, rather than incentives, in their
system.

This has been a tragedy for their people, for the

rules of distribution and trade are meaningless if there is
little to distribute or to export.
As economists, we should do all we can to point out
the probable economic repercussions of departing from well
established economic principles.

This applies, of course,
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to domestic production and marketing policies, an area in
which economists have usually had a good bit to say, and at
times considerable influence.

But it also applies to inter-

national trade policy, an area in which economists have
traditionally been much less active, and of relatively limited
influence.

Therefore, I would like to concentrate today on

(1) international trade policy in the agricultural sector as
it now exists,

(2) efforts that are underway to alter the

international trading system, and (3) some contributions that
agricultural economists might appropriately make to that
alteration.

Th~ •eduction and Elimination of Trade Barriers
If the basic objtH::tive of the principle of comparative advantage is even to be approached in the real world, it is imperative that barriers to agricultural trade be reduced and, where
feasible, eliminated.

Increased agricultural production is of

limited usefulness in feeding the hungry of the world if it
cannot move freely across national borders.

Yet, though this

is well understood, barriers to agricultural trade continue
to proliferate.

In many cases, nations have become more,

rather than less, protectionist in recent years.

They have

become highly imaginative in their approach, adding a gamut
of non-tariff barriers to the tariffs that have been with us
for centuries.
Why do they do this in the face of palpable starvation
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in certain parts of the world, and in direct contradiction
to the interests of their own consumers?

As usual, the

reason is part economic, part political.

Some domestic

agricultural sectors are often in a price depressing surplus
situation., even when aggregate food stocks are at dangerously
low levels.

This has been true, for example, in the dairy

industry •Of many countries in recent years, even though grains
have been in short supply.

Beyond that, agricultural interests

are politically strong in many countries, especially in the
developed world, even though their numbers have diminished
dramatically with the technological revolution.

In some,

farmers hold the balance of political power, thereby wielding
an exceJ!)tional degree of political influence.
As a result of all this, domestic agricultural interests
frequently seek -- and obtain

protection from the agricul-

tural exports of other nations.

When they are non-competitive

internationally (as is true, for example, for much of the
small scale agriculture of the European Economic Community),
they battle vigorously for that protection, because their
survival is at stake.
Trade Barriers Erected for Defensive Purposes
The first element of agricultural trade restrictions
is thus defensive in nature, oriented to keeping exports out.
For many years, this was done through tariffs.

But the
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effectiveness of tariffs as a protective mechanism has waned
during the past three decades.

This is due to the half dozen

rounds of trade negotiations that have been conducted under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT), with
tariff levels having been progressively lowered during these
negotiations.

The GATT has helped move the principle of

comparative advantage a bit closer to reality though, unfortunately, with less success in agriculture than in the
industrial sector.
As domestic industries, both agricultural and non-agricultural, in the U.S. and elsewhere have observed the progressive crumbling of tariff protection, other protective mechanisms
have been devised by their governments.

One must give reverse

''credit" where it is due; they have done this very effectively
indeed.

So-called "non-tariff barriers" have become the major

impedient to world trade today.

Whereas the previous rounds

of GATT negotiations dealt almost exclusively with tariffs,
with non-tariff barriers scarcely even being mentioned, the
present Tokyo Round of negotiations probably will devote far
more time to the latter than to the former.

It must do so if

substantial progress is to be made.
What are all these non-tariff barriers, and what are we
seeking to do about them in Geneva?

Let's take the major

ones on an individual basis.
The first, of course, is quantitative restrictions, quotas
if you will.

We in the U.S. have them in dairy products, and
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to a lesser extent in meat.
attacked in Geneva.
of this nature.

Both programs have been vigorously

Other nations have even more restrictions

Though Japan is our best agricultural customer,

it has a multitude of QRs, including a program on meat that was
at least partially responsible for forcing us into our own
voluntary restraint program.

The European Economic Community

li~wi~~ has numerous quantitative restrictions, along with
its variable levy system.

And the lesser developed countries

have moved heavily to quota programs, typically rationalizing
them on balance of payments grounds, or for "safeguard" purposes, i.e., •to. protect infant industries.
From an economist's viewpoint, a quantitative restriction
is one of the most disconcerting trade barriers of all, for it
flies directly in the face of competitive forces.

What good

does it do to become more efficient than anyone else in wheat
produ£::tion, e.g., if one can sell only "X" bushels in a given
market irrespective of price considerations?

Yet this is

the situation faced by many of our competitive agricultural
industries (and the competitive industries of many other
countries as well), all to protect relatively less efficient
agricultural producers of importing nations.

Perhaps one can

rationalize a certain production level of basic food products
in any country, even though that production be uneconomic
and violative of the principle of comparative advantage.
Political and possibly even national security considerations
ntay predominate in such a case.

But this too should be kept
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in perspective by policy makers.

Does a goal of "total self-

sufficiency in rice" really make sense in Japan?

Partial

self-sufficiency, perhaps; but total self-sufficiency, one
must wonder!

At the very least, the economists of Japan, the

United States, or any other country should point out to their
policy

makers the opportunity cost of such decisions.

Quantitative restrictions form one of the major areas
of effort now underway in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations
in Geneva (the Tokyo Round).

So far, we have had notifica-

tions and discussions on a bilateral basis between and among
the 90 nations that are participating.

We are not yet at the

negotiating stage, even bilaterally, and far from it on
devising any multilateral solutions to this problem.

But

we need to work at it with vigor, lest we conclude the negotiations with little progress in this distortive area of
international trade.
The European Community has resisted the inclusion of
variable levies in the Geneva deliberations of the Quantitative Restrictions Group.

It has, in fact, resisted their

inclusion in the deliberations of any of the basic functional

MTN groups, notwithstanding their obvious effect on international trade.
Variable levies are among the most frustrating trade
barriers of all, particularly to the U.S. and other exporters
as they seek to establish markets in the Community and in other
nations which use them.

The essence of the variable levy is

that when world market prices fall, the levy automatically
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increases.

This makes it essentially impossible for an ex-

porting country to expand its sales even though market conditions would ordinarily provide that thrust.

The positive

impact on sales that should result where import demand is
not completely inelastic is negated by the variable levy.
This not only frustrates the competitiveness of a given
country, such as the U.S., but it also shifts -- in a
distortive way -- the burden of market adjustments.

The in-

ternational market for a given commodity becomes "thinner,"
for those nations which apply the variable levy isolate themselves from the impact (or at least the full impact) of supply
and demand conditions elsewhere.

Though their market remains

relatively stable, price fluctuations elsewhere become greater
than would otherwise be the case.

This occurred, for example,

as the world sought to adjust to the severe drought in the
U.S. Corn Belt in 1974.

The price of feed grains rose dramati-

cally in the U.S. and in most parts of the world.

U.S. live-

stock and poultry producers suffered through severe financial
losses and ultimately adjusted by altering the grain content
of their rations, reducing feeding periods, and in some cases
even closing down their operations.

It was a major adjustment

on our part, and one reason was that nations
levies did not share in that adjustment.

th variable

Feed grain usage

in the European Community changed very little during that
period and, in fact, its mountain of dairy surpluses continued
to rise.

-
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Variable levies have a cost, to the world trading community
as a whole since they are a flagrant departure.from the principle
of comparative advantage, and particularly to those nations
who are forced to absorb the world's supply and demand adjustments.

But they also have a cost to the consumers of the

nations which use them.
vide stability.

Their proponents argue that they pro-

That they do, but it is the worst possible

kind of stability for a consumer!

In terms of food costs,

variable levies simply remove the valleys, and leave the consumer with nothing but peaks!

That, unfortunately, is the

lot of EC consumers, and will be until they achieve a stronger
political presence than they have today.
Import licenses, import deposits, customs regulations,
customs valuation procedures, and minimum import prices all
have many of the distortive features of quantitative restrictions.

Sometimes they are even more troublesome, for the

restrictiveness is difficult, if not impossible, to prove.
In licensing, for example, licenses just do not seem to be
issued!

Or, if they are issued, it is after an inordinate

delay -- usually at about the time the product is no longer
in season in the exporting country!

Administrative procedures

can be exceptionally time consuming when someone has a vested
interest in their being so.
Import deposit schemes obviously have a cost.

Money

is not interest free, and the cost of a deposit must be borne
by someone in the marketing process.

- 10 Customs regulations can be as frustrating as import
licensing.

At times, it takes a long while for all those

forms to be completed and stamped.

With perishable products,

they seem to be completed just as the product has "perished."
Finally, valuation procedures can add an unexpected cost
to imports as well.

One would assume that the invoice price

would be used as the base for customs valuation procedures,
but this is often not the case.

One of our neighbor countries,

for example, uses "official prices" on many imported goods,, and
these prices often are considerably higher than the invoice
amount.
All of these practices are presently being scrutinized
in a Customs Subgroup in Geneva.

Hopefully progress will be

made to minimize their impact on international trade.

In

particular, changes in this area are contributions that the
less developed countries could and should make to the MTN.
Even standards, whose basic purpose is to foster trade, can
be and are used to impede it.

About two years ago Canada banned

the import of U.S. beef, allegedly because we then permitted our
cattle feeders to use diethylstilbestrol as a feed additive.
DES significantly increases weight gains in fattening cattle, but
there is evidence that it may also have carcinogenic properties
under certain conditions.

Hence, the Canadian standard pre-

sumably was designed to protect the health of its consumers
of beef.

USDA, however, responded to the Canadian situation

by implementing a series of surveillance and other measures,

- 11 the purpose of which was to insure that U.S. beef entering
Canada would not contain DES residues.

Eventually the Canadian

government recognized the effectiveness of these measures.
Within a few hours of doing so, they implemented a highly
restrictive quota program on U.S. beef!

One must wonder just

how relevant health considerations were in the original ban.
A similar situation occurred recently involving U.S.
citrus exports to Japan.

The Japanese government abruptly

banned imports of citrus which had been treated by either of
two particular fungicides, even though both had been approved
for use by Codex Alimentarius, an international standards
body of which Japan is a member!

This case is still under

negotiation today.
Fortunately, we appear to be making progress on the
standards front in Geneva.

A good deal of work has been done

over the past two or three years, and hopefully a procedural
code will reach fruition in 1977.

This code will not establish

standards; its purpose is to provide a set of rules that are
to be followed by nations (or other entities such as Codex
Alimentarius) in the standards making process.

The basic

intent is to obtain an open and transparent procedure, so
that those affected will have an opportunity to comment on
a proposed standard before it is implemented rather than
after.

In too many countries that is not now the case.

Other nations are much less inclined to be as open in the
conduct of their regulatory and regulatory-related programs

- 12 as we are.
Government procurement practices have many of the same
restrictive features as standards making.

That is, the basic

problem is that procurement practices are not open.

A

foreign company rarely is the winning bidder on government
procurement contracts.

In some countries, foreign firms

have a difficult time even learning about the contracts until
after they are awarded.

And it is often impossible to deter-

mine the amount of the winning bid.

In other words, "buy

national" programs work very successfully in most nations!
This is not now a major problem for agriculture, but it can
become one as more governments around the world become in-

valved in the purchase of agricultural commodities.

(In one

of our major trading partners, for example, single tendering
/i.e., negotiating with only one bidde~7 is permitted for procurement of any product sold on a commodity exchange.

The

economic rationale of that provision is difficult to fathom!)
The hope here is also to negotiate an international code.
Work in this area has been underway in the Organization of
Economic Cooperation

&

Development (The OECD) for more than

a decade, so far with limited success.

But a negotiating

group will be formed in Geneva on the subject later this year,
and it will be able to build on the OECD experience.

There

is a reasonably good chance that a government procurement
code can be completed in 1977.
The final defensive mechanism worthy of mention is the
traditional tariff.

Though less restrictive in an era of

floating exchange rates than has heretofore been the case,

- 13 it can still be important with certain products and in certain countries.

The U.S. has few tariffs of any consequence

in the agricultural area, but other countries do.
The European Community, fearful that its valuable levies
might be construed as tariffs, was successful in limiting the
tariff cuts of the Kennedy Round in the mid-60s to industrial
cuts.

They did this by keeping agriculture separated from

industry in the negotiations, with the U.S. ultimately discovering that it had little trading stock in agriculture.
Hence, nothing much happened.
The Community is following precisely the same tactics
in the Tokyo Round; early this month they placed their proposed tariff formula on the table in Geneva, and it deliberately excluded agriculture.

This time, however, U.S. nego-

tiators are determined that an industrial-agricultural separation will not occur.

In this they have the strong backing

of the entire U.S. agricultural community, the Congress, our
agricultural advisory committees, and the Trade Act of 1974
itself.

The agricultural "give" in the Kenned.y Rc::n:tnd!l w\ils

primarily by the U.S.; we are determined that this will
not be the case in the Tokyo Round!
So much for defensive actions which nations take to
protect their farmers from international competition.

As

can readily be seen, there are a host of restrictive devices
in use for this purpose.

We can only hope that significant

progress can be made in Geneva to reduce the number and impact of these measures.

If this can be accomplished, we

- 14 will have moved the world a lot closer to an orientation of
competitive agricultural markets, with a substantial comparative advantage characterization.
Trade Measures Taken for Offensive Purposes
Nations can and do take offensive actions to protect
and benefit their farmers too.
export subsidy.

The classic example is the

In this area, economists are somewhat

ambivalent, unsure as to whether such subsidies should be
welcomed, tolerated, or condemned.

Developing countries,

for example, argue that export subsidies are essential, at
least in the short run, if they are ever to become competitive.

This is the infant industry principle or modifications

thereof.

Economies of scale may be necessary for a nation

to achieve competitiveness in the exportation of a given
agricultural product.

This may, so the argument goes, re-

quire both import restrictions and export subsidies; otherwise the market volume necessary for competitive pricing will
never materialize.
The developing countries have a number of additional
arguments in favor of their use of subsidies -- structural
differences, e.g., along with terms of trade issues.
Other nations argue that they have a stronger social
orientation than export competitors like the United States.
Exporting firms must pay their share of the cost of these
domestic social programs.

Therefore, subsidies are required

to offset the competitive disadvantage that would otherwise
occur to exporters in these socially oriented countries.

- 15 I will not debate these issues today.

Suffice it to

say that if the above and other arguments supporting export
subsidies have any validity in economic theory at all, that
validity is primarily, if not entirely, limited to the developing
nations.

I am not persuaded that export subsidies can be justi-

fied in the context of international trade among the developed
countries.

And they certainly cannot be justified in predatory

circumstances, and where abuse of basic economic principles is
flagrant.
In the European Economic Community, export subsidies are
the flip side of the Common Agricultural Policy coin; variable
levies being the other side.

With its inordinately high price

support levels, the CAP must use variable levies to limit
competition from imports.

And it must use export subsidies

to rid itself of the surpluses that are inevitably generated
when support levels become inordinately high.

Without those

subsidies, the Community would find international price
competition in agricultural products to be very tough indeed.
We have used export subsidies of our own in the past -and for the same reason the Community uses them today!

We

permitted our support levels to get too high, and we priced
ourselves out of the world market.

We became residual

suppliers and, as you will all remember, there wasn't much
residual demand in the '60s!
Fortunately, we began in 1965 to alter our farm policies, and
we completed that job in the farm programs that were enacted
by the Congress in the early '70s.

That series of legislation

put us back into the world market -- where we should have been
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I hope

we will never again repeat the policy errors of earlier
decades.

Should we be tempted to do so, we ought simply to

observe the struggles of western Europe's farmers today.
High price supports are deluding them,

just as they deluded

us some years ago.
Recently, for example, the EC made a sale of wheat to
Brazil, a traditional U.S. market.

It took a substantial

subsidy for that sale to be made, i.e., for the EC to be
able to undercut U.S. wheat producers!
What can one do to curb the trade distortions of export subsidies?

First, with respect to subsidies designed

to penetrate one's own market, the solution is relatively
simple.

Countervailing duties can be applied.

We have done

this for both agricultural and non-agricultural products,
to protect U.S. producers from having their domestic market
undercut by subsidized competition from abroad.
Under present U.S. law, "injury" need not be proven in
such cases.

This causes consternation among some of our

trading partners.

But one must ask, where in economic theory

can a case be built for establishing an injury requirement
in such cases, particularly when the "subsidizer" is a
developed nation!
The more difficult case is the one involving "third
country subsidies," e.g., the Brazilian sale to which I

- 17 just alluded.

Countervailing duties are of no avail there --

unless the recipient country can be persuaded to countervail,
which is most unlikely.

The consumers of the recipient nation

will be delighted with the resource transfer represented in
th~ export subsidy!
To deal with the third country situation, an export subsidy code undoubtedly will be required.

There are a good

many other trade policy problems in the subsidy-countervailing
duty area that also merit international attention, i.e.,
inclusion in a code.

For this reason, the United States has

submitted a concepts paper on this subject in Geneva.

Though

negotiations in this area will be extremely difficult and
sensitive (it will probably be the most contentious issue of
all in the MTN), they are critical to the success of the
Tokyo Round.

This is one of the most, if not the most,

significant of the non-tariff trade barriers in use today.
And it is potentially the most economically distortive of
all.

Therefore, it behooves all of ~s to give subsidy practices

our attention, both in an academic setting and at the negotiating table.
A New Challenge -- Supply Access
Restrictions designed to protect and serve the interest
of domestic producers have for many years been the major
challenge faced by trade negotiators.

As I have noted, most

of these restrictions are defensive -- their purpose being
to keep competitive products out.

The exception is export

- 18 subsidies, which are offensive -- their purpose being to
develop export markets.
A new challenge emerged in the clamor over U.S. grain
sales to the Soviet Union, the challenge of export restrictions.

Food price increases in the U.S. during 1973 led

to strong political pressures for export controls.

The con-

sumer movement, which had been languishing somewhat after
its earlier successes on automobile safety, meat inspection,
etc., suddendly found itself with a new cause.
Prior to 1973 food had been a tremendous bargain in the
U.S.

The percentage of income expended for food had dropped

below a mean of 16, for the first time in history, and by
far the lowest in the world.

Relative to the consumers of

other nations, our food is still a bargain, and has been
even in the somewhat chaotic days since those 1972 grain
sales.

Nevertheless, as economists we have learned that

Americans are often less concerned with absolute price
levels than with the rate of change in those levels.

(Witness

the recent adjustments to a higher level of gasoline prices
and the return to bigger cars vis-a-vis the consternation
expressed when gasoline prices began their climb.)
Dramatic incremental adjustments in food costs during
1973 certainly caught the attention of American housewives.
The resultant outcry ultimately (caused at least partially
by the economic distortions of a price-wage control program)
led to the imposition of export controls on soybeans.

In

- 19 retrospect, this was not one of the better public policy
decisions ever made in the U.S.!

From the consumer stand-

point, it impacted adversely on our balance of trade,
weakened the dollar, and thereby made imports more costly.
From the producer standpoint, it did more damage to our
reputation as a dependable supplier (i.e., exporter) of
agricultural products than anything that has happened before
or since.

In addition, it stimulated an enormous investment

in alternative, and ultimately competitive, sources of supply
elsewhere, viz. Brazil.
We are not alone in applying export restrictions.

Other

nations have done so too, for a variety of reasons -- economic,
foreign policy, national security, or combinations thereof.

In

ferrous scrap, for example, essentially everyone but the U.S.
applies export controls.
This issue has stimulated a great deal of discussion in
international fora.
question.

It has become known as the "supply access"

GATT rounds of trade negotiations have to date

been devoted almost exclusively to "market access."

Supply

access has had little attention, but tensions have been building and many believe that a comprehensive code of conduct is
needed.

The major stimulus for this concern has, of course,

come from the OPEC oil cartel.

But there is also concern

about access to food supplies, enhanced by the trend toward
long term contracting among food exporters and importers
and the resultant thinning of the world market.
At the moment no action is underway in Geneva in this
area.

- 20 Summary
In summary, agricultural trade barriers are on the
front burner of the MTN in Geneva.

So long as they are

negotiated with barriers to non-agricultural products,
considerable movement toward a "comparative advantage
world" is possible.

As a major actual and potential ex-

porter of farm products, the U.S. should gain from a
significant reduction and/or elimination of agricultural
trade barriers.

Our producers will benefit directly, our

consumers indirectly.
In specific areas of the negotiations, we are hopeful
that tariff levels will be reduced more than in the Kennedy
Round.

Our own tariff proposal meets that objective.

An

export subsidy-countervailing duty code should emerge at
the end of a hard fought negotiation.

If this does not occur,

the United States will protect itself domestically through
its countervailing duty authority, internationally in third
country subsidy cases through use of the retaliatory provisions of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

A standards

code, which could prove to be extremely important to agriculture, is likely, as is significant progress on quantitative
restrictions.

The probability of agreement on additional

codes -- government procurement, safeguards, and supply access
is difficult to determine at this stage of the negotiating process.

- 21 Our goal is to wind up the Tokyo Round by the end of
1977, meaning that the economic benefits of more liberal
should begin to flow soon thereafter.
Potential Contributions by the Agricultural Economist
I would like now to turn briefly to the role that my

profession might play in international trade policy.
of my comments will be short run

Some

nature, i.e., related

to the MTN; others will have a longer time spectrum.
First, it is important that we in the U.S. develop more
trade policy expertise than we have today.

We are much too

thin -- in government, in the academic community, and in the
private sector -- in people who truly understand international
trade, and trade policy issues.

One of the reasons for this

is that international trade traditionally has not been all
that significant to the U.S. economy.

Until recently it has

composed only 4 or 5 percent of Gross National Product.

But

that figure has since doubled, and is likely to move higher
in the coming years.
significant than that

Export trade is, of course, much more
the agricultural sector.

Another reason for our paucity of international trade talent
is that GATT negotiations have been conducted on a stop and go,
round by-round basis.

We ve

people for each of the

rounds, particularly in Federal agencies.

But then we've

reduced staffing between rounds, and have lost the benef
of that training and experience.

My hope is that we'll

rounds of negotiations, and will develop a
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group of well trained professionals to serve the
needs of U.S. trade policy as we consult and negotiate with
our trading partners on a more or less continuous basis.
Not only are we

the professional area,

but we are also plagued by a level of public knowledge of
international trade that leaves much to be desired.

How

many of our citizens understand the term "balance of trade?"
How many can define "countervailing duties?"
even heard of a "variable levy?"

How many have

As we expand U.S. involve-

ment in international trade, we have a big educational effort
ahead if we are to make sound public policy decisions.

In

the agricultural sector, it is you who must inevitably carry
a large share of that load.
But let us concentrate now on some of our immediate
needs.
First, we need help in the entire area of developeddeveloping country relationships.

Admittedly, political con-

siderations will play a major role in the evolution of these
relationships; witness recent meetings of the United Nations
and its agencies.

Nevertheless, we should operate from the

best possible base of economic theory that we can develop.
Many volumes have already been written on the development process.

But the

negotiating setting.

is not very useful

a

In Geneva, long term ivory tower solu-

tions are of no practical consequence.

We need to know how

we can build "special and differential treatment" for LDCs
into the drafting of a subsidy code, the implementation

- 23 a tariff formula, the concept of safeguarding a nation's
balance of payments.

The protection of the interests of

the U.S. and other developed countries is only one element
of this need; we must also make sure that what is done for
the developing countries is not beneficial in the short run,
detrimental in the long run.
Among the relevant questions of the day are:

"When,

if ever, should either developed or developing countries be
permitted under international rules to use export subsidies?"
"Is maintenance of export earnings, as illustrated, e.g.,
by the Lome Convention, a defensible economic concept?"
"And what of the desire by developing countries for indexation of their exports vis-a-vis imports from the developed
world?''

"How should international trading rules and dispute

settlement provisions respond to developing country cartels?"
"How does one define a developing country?
two or more categories of such countries?
the line be drawn?

What are the criteria?

s:ro.ould there be
If so, where should
When does a nation

'gratuate' from one development stage to the next, and ultimately to developed status?"

"Are there economic tradeoffs

between price stability and the incentive to produce, i.e.,
are private sector incentives reduced when governments implement 'stability' programs?

It is possible to devise stability

mechanisms which are not price depressing?"

"It is economi-

cally feasible for developing countries to apply import restrictions to protect their domestic industries?

If so, when?

-
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Or should their emphasis be on reducing trade barriers in
developed countries, rather than creating barriers of their
own?"

"How does one determine the probable international

competitiveness of a developing country industry?

That is,

how does one decide that the infant industry argument applies?"
"And on what basis should a developed country {or the developing country, for that matter) decide, at a later date, that
the infant industry decision was wrong, and that the industry
should no longer receive special benefits under international
rules?"
These are just a few of a multitude of issues which
exist today in the trade context of DC-LDC relationships.
Many more will emerge in the coming years.

The trend is

clearly toward "more trade, less aid," for LDCs.

That

being the case, we need to learn how that trade can best
be conducted.

If there are to be special rules to benefit

the developing countries -- and this is a foregone conclusion -- then we need to have some imagination in devising
those rules so that all the world will benefit.

Whatever

be the rules, we need to know their probable economic impact.

Today this is a fertile area of interest, but not a

terribly fertile area of knowledge.
Second, we need help in defining "injury" in a trade
policy context and in dealing with the concept of injury in
trade disputes.

One can readily devise dozens of definitions

for injury, depending on the adjective that is used.

One

might have "material injury," "substantial injury," "significant
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injury," or any one of a host of other alternatives.

Each of

these terms can, if one is not careful, be interpreted in many
different ways.
Injury ought to be an economic concept, not a political
one.

We ought first to determine where in the GATT rules and

codes proof of injury is even appropriate.

The U.S. does

not now apply an injury test in the application of its
countervailing duty law, and we are not at all persuaded
that our law should be changed.

If, however, injury might

appropriately be insisted upon as a prerequisite to certain
actions taken under the GATT, the definition and interpretation
of the concept becomes of critical importance.

Can one

adjective serve the needs of all rules and all codes?

If

not, how does one avoid confusion between an injury provision in a subsidy code which uses one adjective, and a
similar provision in a safeguards code with a different
adjective.

Add to this the possibility of still another

definition for developing countries and it is no wonder
that one of the needs in the GATT is for an improved dispute
settlement procedure!

If economists can help us to make

sense of the injury question, we will be eternally grateful.
Third, we need to learn a lot more about the implications of floating exchange rates to trade policy.

For

example, should nations now be precluded from using trade
measures to rectify balance of payments deficits?

·will not

floating exchange rates do the job, thereby avoiding the use
of trade restrictions which distort international economic

-

relationships?
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Or is there likely to be a lag involved with

floating, such that trade measures will still be needed?
Should trade measures then be more carefully circumscribed
in their time frame, so that floating rates will take over
the balancing job as quickly as possible?
float?"

And what of "dirty

Though this may lead to increased stability in ex-

change rates, will it not also prevent some of the benefits
of cleim floating from being fully realized?

And what of the

nations which maintain a fixed exchange rate relationship
with some countries, but float vis-a-vis others?

How can

their situation be meshed into the GATT rules of the future?
Finally, how can we do a better job of coordinating monetary
and trade policy internationally?
The era of floating exchange rates is just beginning to
unfold.

It is imperative that we quickly and comprehensively

study and evaluate the economic impact of floating, and apply
what we learn in the development of U.S. and international
trade policy.

This is an area in which sophisticated economic

analysis can have a very great payoff.
Fourth, we badly need updated estimates of price and
income elasticities for all significant U.S. exports and imports.

Present data is simply inadequate.

It is unfortunate

that we must go into a negotiation as important as the Tokyo
Round, with billions of dollars of international trade at
stake, and be dependent upon elasticity estimates that are
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obsolete and of dubious accuracy.

Elasticity estimates are

relevant to every phase of the negotiations -- to determine
the probable impact of a given tariff formula, to evaluate
the effect of excepting a particular product from the
application of that formula, to appraise probable trade
flows that will emerge from granting LDCs a given type of
special and differential treatment, etc.

If U.S. agricul-

tural economists can provide our negotiators with improved
elasticity estimates in the future, it will be of very great
benefit to all.
Fifth, we live in a country in which private enterprise
has been the bulwark of our economic development.

This is

especially true in agriculture, where we have long been at
the head of the class in both production practices and marketing techniques.
Our market oriented system has served us well.

Yet the

trend elsewhere in the world seems often to be in the other
direction.
economy.

Government planners typically want to manage the
One constantly hears the refrain, "The market system

just won't work for us."
the past."

Or, "The free market is a thing of

But must it be!

Cannot we, as U.S. agricultural

economists, provide a private sector alternative that will
serve the agricultural needs of other nations?

Can we not

show them the benefits of private incentives, as reflected
by the performance of U.S. farmers?

For example, would it

not be beneficial to point out the dramatic way in which
American farmers shift their cropping practices in response
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to

ce s

s, and alter their livestock operations for

the same reason?

Could we not, for example, describe the

workings of U.S. futures markets and the potential they have
for stabilizing prices of given commodities -- in the
aggregate and for an individual producer or processor?
Might this not be a viable alternative, for a good many
commodities at least, to much more costly buffer stock
schemes?
Technical assistance is, of course, an important aspect
of all of this.

If U.S. agricultural economists have some-

thing worthwhile to say to the rest of the world, and particularly to the developing countries which are so much in
need, it will have to be said primarily through technical
assistance programs.

We've done a lot in this area, perhaps

more than any other developed country in the world.
only scratched the surface.

But we've

Though we have generally embarked

upon technical assistance efforts out of humanitarian motives,
those efforts have usually turned out to be in our self interest.
As we have taught farmers in other countries to produce more,
the total development process of those countries has accelerated.
This has made them better customers for our industrial goods,
and likewise better customers for U.S. agricultural exports
as they upgrade their diets by expanding livestock and poultry
production.

Hence, with an effective technical assistance

program, the recipient country gains, and we gain.

Should we

not then have a much stronger commitment to such endeavors,
both in our nation as a whole,

among our academic institutions?
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Conclusion
One could go on with many other examples of economic work
for which there is a dire need in the trade policy arena.

I

have cited only a few in which present deficiencies are particularly glaring.

There is much to do if we are to make sound

public policy decisions in this area, decisions that will
advance the cause of American agriculture.

I know that you

have both the talent and the enthusiasm to undertake this
most important task.

Thank you.

